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‘If God does not exist, everything is permissible.’ Deleuze likes to invert this
Dostoyevskian formula from The Brothers Karamazov, because, he says, the
opposite is in fact the case: it is with God that everything is permissible. This is
obviously true morally, since the worst atrocities have always managed to find a
divine justification, and belief in God has never been a guarantor of morality. But it
is also true aesthetically and philosophically. Medieval art, for example, is filled
with images of God, and it would be tempting to see this merely as an inevitable
constraint of the era, imposed from without by the Church. Deleuze suggests a
different hypothesis. In the hands of great painters like El Greco, Tintoretto and
Giotto, this constraint became the condition of a radical emancipation: in painting
the divine, one could take literally the idea that God must not be represented, an idea
that resulted in an extraordinary liberation of line, colour, form, and movement.
With God, painting found a freedom it would not have had otherwise – a properly
pictorial atheism.1
The same was true in philosophy. Until the revolution of the eighteenth century,
philosophers were constantly speaking of God, to the point where philosophy
seemed completely compromised by theology and the demands of the Church. But,
in the hands of great philosophers such as Spinoza and Leibniz, this constraint
became the condition of an equally extraordinary liberation. With God,
philosophical concepts were freed from the traditional task that had been imposed
on them – the representation of things – and allowed to assume fantastic dimensions.
With the concept of God, everything was permissible. Or almost everything, for
thinkers (like Spinoza) who went too far with the concept, or went too fast, often did
so at their own peril. Deleuze thus harbours neither the antagonism of the ‘secular’
who find the concept of God outmoded, nor theangst or mourning of those for whom
the loss of God was crisis-provoking, nor the faith of those who would like to
retrieve the concept in a new form. He remained fascinated with theological
concepts, and regarded medieval theologians in particular as a magnificent breed of
thinkers who were able to invent, in the name of God, remarkable systems of logic
and physics. Indeed, at several points in his writings, he picked up on certain
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‘heretical’ paths of theological thought closed off by orthodoxy and seemingly
abandoned, and set them to work philosophically in a different context.
Deleuze’s appropriation of the medieval concept of univocity is the most obvious
and important example of this unorthodox use of the Christian theological tradition.
The doctrine of the ‘univocity of Being’ was an ontological theory developed in the
thirteenth century by Duns Scotus, following Henry of Ghent, in his magnum opus
entitled Opus Oxoniense, which Deleuze calls ‘the greatest book of pure ontology’.2
In the Middle Ages, univocity was a heterodox position, constantly at the borders of
heresy, and had limited currency outside the Scotistic school (the English word
‘dunce’ is derived from the term of approbation used to describe the followers of
Duns Scotus).3 The concept has a rather curious history in Deleuze’s own work. The
term was not even mentioned before 1968, when univocity suddenly became an
important theme in almost all of Deleuze’s writings. It first appears in
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, where it forms the ‘keystone’ of Deleuze’s
interpretation of Spinoza (even more than the title concept of ‘expression’).4 It then
assumes an even more prominent role in Difference and Repetition and in The Logic
of Sense, where Deleuze not only identifies an entire tradition of univocity in the
history of philosophy, running from Duns Scotus (against Thomism) through
Spinoza (against Cartesianism) to Nietzsche (against Hegelianism), but also
presents his own ontology as a univocal ontology, thereby, as it were, identifying
himself as the most recent inheritor of that tradition. And then, equally abruptly, and
without explanation, the concept disappears, almost without a trace; it is scarcely
mentioned in any of Deleuze’s subsequent works.
What role does thedoctrine of univocity play in Deleuze’s thought? And why does
the concept have such a short-lived but intense trajectory in Deleuze’s writings, like
a flashing meteor? Despite Deleuze’s provocative claim, there is no ‘tradition’ of
univocity in the history of philosophy, apart from the one he himself creates; there
is hardly a secondary literature on the concept outside of Scotistic studies. Deleuze
was more accurate when he remarked, in a seminar, that univocity is ‘the strangest
thought, the most difficult to think, if it has ever been thought’.5 In what follows, I
attempt to follow the life of this ‘strange’ concept as it appears, matures, and then
passes away within the flow of Deleuze’s thought, creating unexpected ‘traversals’
between otherwise disconnected thinkersand problems. Were one to ‘dramatise’ the
movement of the concept, it could perhaps be staged in four separate acts.
Act One would take us back to the medieval articulations of the concept. For Duns
Scotus, as for many Scholastic philosophers, the object of theology was God, while
the object of philosophy, or rather of the metaphysics crowning it, was Being as
Being. In developing his theory of univocity, DunsScotus was injecting himself into
a lively thirteenth-century debate concerning the nature of Being: Being is said of
beings, but in what sense? The Scholastics used three precise terms to designate the
various ways of resolving the problem: equivocity, univocity and analogy. To say
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that Being is equivocal means that the term ‘Being’ is said of beings in several
senses, and that these senses have no common measure: ‘God is’ does not have the
same sense as ‘man is’, for instance, because God does not have the same type of
being as man. By contrast, to say that Being is univocal, as Duns Scotus affirmed,
means that Being has only one sense, and is said in one and the same sense of
everything of which it is said, whether it be God or man, animal or plant. Since these
positions seemed to lead to scandalous conclusions – (equivocity denied order in the
cosmos, univocity implied pantheism) – a third alternative was developed between
these two extremes: Being is neither equivocal nor univocal but analogical. This
became the position of Christian orthodoxy, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas:
there is indeed a common measure to the forms of Being, but this measure is
analogical, and not univocal.
Why did Deleuze revisit this seemingly obscure Scholastic debate? The answer
seems clear: the three books Deleuze published in 1968–9 (Expressionism in
Philosophy: Spinoza, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense) mark,
among other things, the culmination of Deleuze’s confrontation with Heidegger.
This confrontation had been present in Deleuze’s work from the start, even if
Heidegger’s name receives only passing mention in the texts.6 As always, Deleuze
brings a contemporary problematic to bear on his work in the history of philosophy.
Heidegger (who wrote his own thesis on Duns Scotus) famously inaugurated the
modern renaissance of ontology by posing the question of the ‘ontological
difference’: what is the difference between Being and beings? Or, more precisely:
how is Being distributed among beings? During the Middle Ages, this ontological
problem had been intertwined with a similar, though not identical, set of theological
questions: what is the difference between God and his creatures? Or put logically, in
terms of the ‘divine names’ tradition: in what sense can we predicate of God the
same terms (e.g. goodness) that we use of his creatures? The concept of univocity
was situated at the nexus of this complex set of philosophical and theological
questions.
According to Deleuze, however, although Heidegger revived the question of
ontology and gave ‘renewed splendor to the univocity of Being’, he did not effect
the necessary conversion according to which ‘univocal Being belongs only to
difference’ (DR, p. 66).7 Heidegger, in other words, was unable, or perhaps
unwilling, to push the problematic of ontological difference to its necessary
conclusion. This is the project that Deleuze takes up as his own in Difference and
Repetition. In this sense, univocity must be seen as one of the concepts Deleuze uses
in order to state and resolve Heidegger’sontological problematic in his own manner.
For Deleuze, the only pure and fully realised ontology must be a univocal ontology,
and only a univocal ontology is capable of thinking difference-in-itself, or of
providing difference with its own concept. As Foucault put it, in his well known
essay on Deleuze, the univocity of Being is ‘the principal condition which permits
difference to escape the domination of identity’.8 But this link between univocity
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and difference might seem obscure: if Being is univocal, what constitutes the
difference between beings? Why does a philosophy of difference require a univocal
ontology?
In the second act, Deleuze begins to respond to these questions by turning, not to
Duns Scotus, who plays the role of a precursor, but rather to Spinoza, who,
according to Deleuze, gave the concept of univocity its fullest expression.
‘Univocity’, Deleuze claims, ‘is the keystone of Spinoza’sentire philosophy’ – even
though the word does not appear even once in Spinoza’s texts.9 Deleuze, however,
often employs this ‘topological’ method in his historical monographs: when he
interprets Bergson in terms of the concept of ‘difference’ (as formulated by
Heidegger), or Leibniz in terms of a theory of ‘singularities’ (borrowed from Albert
Lautmann), or Spinoza in terms of ‘univocity’ (imported from Duns Scotus), he is
using a ‘foreign’ concept, not explicitly formulated by the thinkers at hand, to bring
out aspects of their thought that might otherwise remain obscure.
Deleuze’s affinity with Spinoza here is not incidental. Heidegger himself wrote
notoriously little on Spinoza – a surprising omission, it would seem, since the Ethics
is a work of pure ontology that poses the problem of ontological difference in terms
of the difference between infinite substance (Being) and finite modes (beings).
Deleuze’s work on Spinoza, from this viewpoint, can be read as his means of
working through the problematic of ontological difference in a new manner, just as
Difference and Repetition could be read as a response to Being and Time (for
Deleuze, Being is difference, and time is repetition). Where Heidegger returns to the
Greeks (the origin), Deleuze turns to Spinoza (the middle). According to Deleuze,
univocity assumes three figures in Spinoza’s philosophy: univocity of the attributes,
univocity of cause, and univocity of modality; they are the three important scenes of
the second act. The first two, however, are particularly important in showing how
Spinoza overturned the medieval theological tradition, at the price of his
condemnation.
In the Middle Ages, as Heidegger says, ontology became an onto-theology: the
question of theBeing of beings tended to be forgotten in favour of the thought of God
as the supreme (ontic) being. The Christian concept of God was the inheritor of the
Platonic ‘Good’ and the neoplatonic ‘One’, which were ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ Being
(hyperousios, epikeina tes ousias), that is, transcendent to Being. Christian theology
thus oscillated between a double requirement: immanence (the ontological
requirement that the first principle be a being) and transcendence (the more
powerful requirement that the transcendence of God be maintained, as the One
beyond Being). The ‘divine names’ tradition, in turn, was concerned with the
manner in which the traditional divine attributes (e.g. goodness, love, wisdom,
power, etc.) could be predicated of God – negatively or positively? As conditional
affirmations, or negations marking the ablation of some privation? The Christian
tradition identified two extreme (and heterodox) responses to this question: pure
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transcendence would imply the equivocity of terms; pure immanence, their
univocity. Between these two poles, orthodoxy developed a via media approach to
the problem, centred in large part on the strategies of negation, eminence and
analogy. These five ways – equivocity, negation, eminence, analogy, univocity –
entered into historically varying combinations in Christian thought, though two
general approaches assumed the status of orthodoxy: a way of negation and a way
of affirmation.
The way of negation, which came to be called ‘negative theology’ (following
Pseudo-Dionysius), admits that affirmations are able to designate God as cause,
subject to rules of immanence, but insists that God as substance or essence can only
be defined negatively, according to rules of transcendence. Meister Eckhart, for
instance, prefers to say ‘God is not’ rather than ‘God is’, because ‘x is’ is a statement
that is said of beings, whereas God is eminently superior to Being, beyond Being.10
This allows God to appear in his ‘supra-substantial’ or ‘supra-essential’ eminence,
as far from all negation as from all affirmation. Negative theology can therefore be
defined by its dynamics: one goes beyond affirmations (God is good) via negations
(God is not good in the human sense of the term), and beyond both affirmations and
negations to attain God’s eminence (God is good with an ‘incomparable’ or
‘ineffable’ goodness). By contrast, a theology with more positive ambitions, like
that of Thomas Aquinas, relies on analogy to found new affirmative rules. Positive
qualities can indeed belong to God substantially, but only insofar as they are treated
‘analogically’, either in terms of an ordered relationship between two proportions,
e.g. the divine goodness is to God as human goodness is to man (analogy of
proportionality); or by reference to a focal meaning or ‘prime analogate’ e.g.
‘goodness,’ which God possesses eminently and creatures only derivatively
(analogy of proportion). The way of affirmation must likewise be defined by a
specific dynamic: it maintains the strength of the negative and the eminent, but
comprehends them within analogy.11
The audacity of Spinoza’s ‘heresy’ was to have rejected both these orthodox
approaches – the negative and the positive, the apophatic and kataphatic – and to
have set against them the heterodox doctrine of the univocity of the divine attributes.
For Spinoza, we know only two of God’s infinite attributes (thought and extension),
and these attributes are common forms predicable univocally of both God and his
creatures. Though formally distinct, theattributes are ontologically univocal. To say
that the attributes are univocal means, for example, that it is in the same form that
bodies imply extension, and that extension isan attribute of the divine substance (the
position of immanence). If Spinoza radically rejects the notions of eminence,
equivocity, and even analogy, it is because they imply that God possesses these
perfections in a form different from that implied in his creatures, a ‘higher’ form (the
position of transcendence). Spinoza’s genius lies in his having provided a profound
explanation for his rejection of these orthodox positions: the problem they were
attempting to solve, he says, was an altogether false one, and this for two reasons.
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On the one hand, as Spinoza argues in the Short Treatise, theologians had tended
to confuse God’s attributes with his propria. Following Aristotle, Spinoza defines a
proprium as that which belongs to a thing, but can never explain what it is. The
attributes that have traditionally been ascribed to God are not attributes, Spinoza
explains, but mere propria. They reveal nothing of the divine essence. The Short
Treatise distinguishes three types of propria of God: the first type are modalities of
the divine essence that must be affirmed of all God’s attributes (cause of itself,
infinite, perfect, immutable, eternal, necessary, etc.), or of a specific attribute
(omniscience is affirmed of thought; omnipresence is affirmed of extension); the
second type are those that qualify God in reference to his products or creations
(cause of all things, predestination, providence); the third type, finally, do not even
belong to God, but designate extrinsic determinations that merely indicate the way
we imagine God, failing to comprehend his true nature (justice, charity,
compassion). The basic error of theology is that it confuses God’s essence with these
propria, and this confusion pervades the entire language of eminences, negations
and analogies. When propria are given a substantial value that they do not have, the
divine substance is given an inexpressible nature that it does not have either. And
this error, in turn, has compromised the whole of philosophy. Even Descartes was
content to define God as infinite perfection, though perfection and infinity are
merely modalities of the divine essence (propria of the first type).12
On the other hand, Spinoza offers a genetic account of this theological error in the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Why was the nature of God denatured in this way?
Because, Spinoza explains, his predecessors lacked a proper historico-critical
method for interpreting Scripture. They simply presumed that God had revealed his
nature in Scripture. But in fact, the aim of Scripture is to give us models of life, to
make us obey, and to ground our obedience through its warnings, commandments
and rules. ‘Revealed theology’ concerns itself exclusively with propria of the third
type, which appeal to our imaginations to make us serve a God of whose nature we
remain ignorant. As for God’s true attributes (thought and extension), they are made
known through the light of Nature, not revelation. The nature of God is made
manifest in the order of Nature, not in the teachings of the Bible. Spinoza likes to
remind us that the prophets were men with vivid imaginations but weak
understandings: Adam, Abraham, and Moses were not only ignorant of the true
divine attributes, but also of most of the propria of the first and second type.13
According to Harry Wolfson, the Tractatus overturned a long hermeneutical
tradition that had been inaugurated centuries earlier by Philo: after Spinoza,
Scripture could and would no longer be treated as a properly philosophical
authority.14
The univocity of the attributes entails the absolute immanence of God and Nature,
Deus sive natura, stripping God of any transcendence (it matters little whether this
is understood as pantheism or atheism). What Deleuze finds in Spinoza, prior to
Hume and Kant’s critiques of theology, or even Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’, is a quiet
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and confident philosophy of immanence, the consequences of which he will pursue
throughout his writings. But already, one can sense Deleuze manoeuvring between
Scylla and Charybdis: univocity is as opposed to the negative eminence of the
neoplatonists as to the positive analogies of the Thomists, both of which have their
modern counterparts.
The second figure of univocity Deleuze finds in Spinoza is the univocity of cause:
God is cause of all things in the same sense that he is cause of himself. Broadly
speaking, medieval philosophy distinguished between three types of causes: a
transitive cause, an emanative cause, and an immanent cause. A transitive cause is
a cause that leaves itself in order to produce, and what it produces (its effect) is
outside of itself. Christianity held to the idea of a real distinction between God and
the world: if God created the world, and the world is exterior to God, then God must
come out of himself in order to create the world; it therefore needed to see God as a
purely transitive cause (creationism). An emanative cause, by contrast, is a cause
whose effect is exterior to it, but which nonetheless remains within itself in order to
produce its effect. The sun, for example, remains within itself in order to produce,
but what it produces (light) comes out of it. Such metaphors of luminosity are
frequent in Plotinus and the neoplatonists, who pushed an emanative conception of
cause to its furthest point. An immanent cause, finally, is a cause that not only
remains within itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effect also
remains within it. This is the conception of causality developed by Spinoza.
Here again, Christian theology adopted a syncretic solution: is God a transitive
cause, an emanative cause, or an immanent cause?15 Orthodoxy insisted that God is
a transitive cause, transcendent to the world (creation ex nihilo). How then does God
create the world? He would have to have a model or idea of the world in his
understanding, and he would create the world, in conformity with this model,
through a free act of the divine will. But this is a fully immanent causality: the model
or idea must remain in God’s understanding, and God must remain in himself in
order to contemplate it. To reconcile these two movements, one requires the idea of
an emanative causality between the model of the world in God’s understanding and
the real world produced in conformity with this model. Medieval thinkers
consequently had to combine the three types of causality in varying permutations.
The idea of an immanent causality, Deleuze suggests, functioned as a kind of
internal theoretical limit for philosophers and theologians up to the Renaissance
(Nicholas of Cusa, Erigena, Bruno, Eckhart) – a limit, however, that was always
repulsed, out of a concern to avoid pantheism, through the doctrines of creation (by
a transcendent being above his creatures) and emanation (from a transcendent One
beyond Being). Spinoza was the sole thinker to take causality to this immanent limit,
at the price of his condemnation.
What are the consequences of an immanent causality? In an emanative causality,
the One is the cause of Being, but the cause (the One) remains beyond its effect
(Being). This is the sense of Plotinus’ notion of the gift: Being is a gift or donation
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of the One, but the One necessarily remains beyond Being. Ontologically, the
universe is in this way rendered hierarchical – beings having more or less reality
depending on their distance from or proximity to the One as the transcendent first
principle (the ‘great chain of Being’). Morally, it allows Being to be judged because
there is an authority higher than Being itself (the ‘system of judgement’). The One
is thus inseparable from a negative theology or a method of analogy, which are
required to maintain this eminence of the cause. Heidegger seems to have remained
tied to a certain conception of eminence in his famous lecture on ‘Time and Being,’
where he developed the theme of the es gibt, that is, the ‘gift’ (Gabe) of time and
Being by the It.16 Jacques Derrida, in his later works, has moved towards a
philosophy of transcendence, influenced by Levinas and linked to the theme of a
negative theology.17
Deleuze has followed a very different path. In Spinoza’s immanent causality, not
only does the cause remain in itself, but its effect remains ‘immanate’ within it,
rather than emanating from it. The effect (mode) remains in its cause no less than the
cause remains in itself (substance). Hence Deleuze’s fondness for the
‘expressionistic’ Renaissance notions of complicareand explicare, which he adopts
for his own purposes in Difference and Repetition: all thingsare present to God, who
complicates them, and God is present to all things, which ‘explicate’ and ‘implicate’
him. In an immanent ontology, Being necessarily becomes univocal: not only is
Being equal in itself, it is equally and immediately present in all beings, without
mediation or intermediary. There is no distant cause, no ‘chain of Being’, no
hierarchy, but rather a kind of anarchy of beings within Being. The rock, the lily, the
beast, the human equally sing the glory of God in a kind of crowned anarchy’.18 One
must not be led astray (as Alain Badiou seems to have been) by the prefix ‘uni’ in
the term ‘univocity’: a univocal ontology is by definition irreconcilable with a
philosophy of the One, which necessarily entails an equivocal concept of Being.19
These then, in brief, are the three figures of univocity Deleuze identifies in
Spinoza: the univocity of the attributes (the attributes are said in one and the same
sense of God and his creatures), the univocity of cause (God is cause of himself in
the same sense that he is cause of all things), and the univocity of modality (God is
necessary in the same sense that all things are necessary). I will leave it to readers to
explore the heretical consequences of the denial of free will in the third figure of
univocity. Taken together, they effect what Deleuze calls a ‘pure’ ontology, that is,
an ontology in which there is nothing beyond or outside or superior to Being. But
this is only the first half of the unfolding of the concept of univocity in Deleuze.
‘Have I been understood? – Univocity versus Analogy’: such is the Nietzschean
gauntlet Deleuze throws down in Difference and Repetition, the third and most
important act in the story of univocity. Difference and Repetition links the project of
a pure ontology, as developed by Spinoza, with the problematic of difference, as
formulated by Heidegger, and in the process goes beyond both Spinoza and
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Heidegger. The conversion Deleuze effects from identity to difference is as
important as Spinoza’s move from transcendence to immanence. According to
Klossowski’s thesis, the concept of God has always functioned as a guarantor of the
principle of identity.20 Even in Spinoza, modes are modifications of substance, and
the concept of substance (or God) can still be said to maintain the rights of identity
over difference. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference must thus be seen as a kind of
Spinozism minus substance, a purely modal or differential universe.21 Difference
and Repetition is an experiment in metaphysics whose aim is to provide a
(transcendental) description of the world from the viewpoint of a principle of
difference rather than the principle of identity. ‘In accordance with Heidegger’s
ontological intuition’, Deleuze writes, ‘difference must be articulation and
connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation
whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed’ (DR, p. 117).
Despite his indebtedness to Heidegger, however, Deleuze never subscribed to the
theme of the ‘overcoming of metaphysics’. He describes himself as a ‘pure
metaphysician’,22 a classical philosopher who sees his philosophy as a system,
albeit an open and ‘heterogenetic’ system.23 Though obviously indebted to such
metaphysical thinkers as Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson, Deleuze appropriates their
respective systems of thought only by pushing them to their ‘differential’ limit,
purging them of the three great terminal points (God, world, self) of traditional
metaphysics. Deleuze’s historical monographs, in this sense, are preliminary
sketches for the great canvas of Difference and Repetition.
Aristotle appears as an important dramatis persona in Difference and Repetition,
and for good reason. Aristotle held a famous thesis concerning difference: different
things differentiate themselves only through what they have in common. This
subordination of difference to identity can be seen in the schematisation of
Aristotle’s ontology known as Porphyry’s Tree (Figure 1). In the middle regions of
the tree, specific difference allows a genus or concept to remain the same in itself
(identity) while becoming other in the opposing predicates (differences) that divide
it. This process of specification in turn reaches a limit at either end of the table. At
the lower end, a plurality of different individuals can be placed under a single
concept only on the condition that a sensible resemblance between the individuals
can be perceived. At the upper end, the differences between the highest genera or
‘categories’ can be related to the concept of Being only through an operation that
would come to be known as analogy. Aristotle thus subordinates difference to four
interrelated principles: identity in the concept and the opposition of predicates
(specific difference), resemblance in perception (individual difference), and the
analogy of judgement (generic difference).Readers will recognise thisquadripartite
structure of ‘representation’ as one of the recurring motifs of Difference and
Repetition.
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Figure 1 Porphyry’s Tree
Adapted from E. M. Curley (1969) Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation,
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, p. 29.
Deleuze contrasts the ‘univocity of Being’ point by point with Aristotle’s theory
of the ‘analogy of Being,’ which dominated medieval philosophy prior to Spinoza.
Is Being distributed among beings univocally or analogically? This question
concerns a very specific problem: the relation of Being to the ‘categories’. Kant
defined a category as a concept that can be said of every object of possible
experience (causality is a category because every object has a cause and is itself
cause of other things). Aristotle’s formulation amounts to the same thing: the
categories are the different senses in which Being is said of beings, they are different
senses of the word Being.24 In Heidegger’s formulation, the categories are the
fundamental ‘determinations of the Being of beings’, the fundamental ontological
predicates.25 But what then is the relation of Being, as the most general concept, to
the categories, as the highest genera? Aristotle recognised that Being cannot be a
univocal genus in relation to the categories, and this for a precise reason: because
differences ‘are’. To predicate Being as an overarching genus would deny the being
of difference; or rather, it would mean that the genus ‘Being’ would have to be
predicated twice, once to its species, and once to its own differentiae.26 Generic
difference must therefore be of another nature than specific difference: whereas a








Corporeal Incorporeal specific difference
Body subaltern genus
Animate Inanimate specific difference IDENTITY
in the concept
Living thing subaltern genus
Sensitive Insensitive specific difference
Animal subaltern genus OPPOSITION
of predicates
Rational Nonrational specific difference
Human infima species
(smallest determined concepts)




*Aristotle’s ten categories: substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position,
state, activity, passivity.
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necessarily equivocal. The categories, Aristotle concluded, must therefore be
related to each other analogically. Every philosophy of the categories, from
Aristotle through Kant and Hegel, implies an analogical ontology.
In Aristotle, the analogy of Being has two fundamental forms, both of which
would be taken up theologically by later thinkers such as Aquinas. On the one hand,
the concept of Being has no content in itself, but only a distributive content that is
proportional to the formally different categories of which it is predicated (analogy
of proportionality). The ‘proportionality’ involved here need not be understood in a
strict mathematical sense (a:b:c:d), since the categories do not need to have an equal
relation to Being, but only an internal relation. On the other hand, Being therefore
tends to form a hierarchical series, insofar as the category of substance assumes the
role of the primary category or the first sense (pros hen) of Being: everything that
‘is’ is a substance, and in turn everything that is a substance has a quality, a quantity,
a place, and so on (analogy of proportion).27 These two forms of analogy are what
Deleuze terms, respectively, the distributive ‘common sense’ and the hierarchical
‘good sense’ (or first sense) of Being.28
What is wrong with Aristotle’s analogical vision of the world? Put simply, it
provides an inadequate solution to the Heideggerian problematic of ontological
difference. On the one hand, it cannot posit Being as a common genus without
destroying the very reason one posits it as such, that is, the possibility of being for
specific differences; it can conceive the universality of Being only as a quasi-
identity. On the other hand, it has to relate Being to particular beings, but it cannot
say what constitutes their individuality: it retains in the particular (the individual)
only what conforms to the general (the concept). An equivocal or analogical concept
of Being, in other words, can only grasp that which is univocal in beings. A true
universal is lacking, no less than a true singular: Being has only a distributive
common sense, and the individual has no difference except a general and reflexive
one in the concept.29
Deleuze’s thesis in Difference and Repetition is that only univocity can provide
us with a truly collective sense of Being (and not merely a distributive sense) by
giving us a comprehension of the play of individuating differences within beings
(and not mere generalities in a network of resemblances). But this brings us,
precisely, to the fundamental problem of a univocal ontology. If Being is said in one
and the same sense of everything that is, then what constitutes the difference
between beings?There can beno categories in a univocalontology: if we distinguish
beings by their substance, or their form, or their generic and specific differences,
then we are back in the analogical vision of the world. Yet if we say that Being is
univocal, that there is no categorical difference between the senses of the word
‘Being’, then we seem to fall into the thought of infamy: the thought of the
inessential, the formless, the non-specific, the non-generic, the non-categorical.
Between God and man, plant and animal, there can be no difference of category, no
difference of substance, no difference of form. This is why Deleuze insists that
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univocity is such a difficult concept to think: how can we say that there are
differences between beings, and nonetheless that Being is said in one and the same
sense of everything that is?
Not surprisingly, it was Spinoza who foresaw the only possible type of solution to
this problem. At this point, the only difference conceivable is difference as a degree
of power or intensity. The power or intensity of a being is its relation to Being. Why
is the idea of difference as a degree of power linked to that of the univocity of Being?
Because beings that are distinguished solely by their degree of power realise oneand
the same univocal Being, except for the difference in their degree of power or its
withdrawal. Difference as a degree of power is a non-categorical difference in that
it preserves the univocal sense of Being.30 Beings are no longer distinguished by a
qualitative essence (analogy of Being) but by a quantifiable degree of power
(univocity of Being). We no longer ask what the essence of a thing is (for instance,
man as a ‘rational animal’ or ‘featherless biped’), but rather what its affective
capacities are, since the power of an existing individual is expressed in a certain
capacity for being affected.
This move already marks an important practical conversion in philosophy, which
Deleuze describesas a shift away from a morality to an ethics. For Deleuze, morality
is fundamentally linked to the notion of essence and the analogical vision of the
world. In Aristotle, man’s essence is to be a rational animal. If he nonetheless acts in
a irrational manner, it is because there are accidents that turn him away from his
essential nature: man’s essence is a potentiality that is not necessarily realised.
Morality can therefore be defined as the effort to rejoin man’s essence, to realise
one’s essence. In an ethics, by contrast, beings are related to Being, not at the level
of essence, but at the level of existence. Ethics defines a person not by what they are
in principle (their essence), but by what they can do, what they are capable of (their
power). Since power is always effectuated – it is never a potentiality, but always in
act – the question is no longer: what must you do in order to realise your essence?,
but rather: what are you capable of doing by virtue of your power? As Eric Alliez
has put it, if analogy is theological (onto-theology), univocity is ethical (onto-
ethology).31 The political problem, in turn, concerns the effectuation of this power:
what conditionsallow one’s power to be effectuated in the best fashion? Conversely,
under what conditions can one actually desire to be separated from one’s power?
One can see clearly how these ontological questions form the basis for the ethico-
political philosophy (and corresponding ‘existential’ notions) developed in
Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
We might note here that Deleuze and Emmanuel Levinas, with their respective
philosophies of immanence and transcendence, represent two very different
approaches to the question of ethics in contemporary thought. If the other is the
fundamental problem of transcendence, difference is the fundamental problem of
immanence. For Levinas, ethics precedes ontology because it introduces an element
of transcendence (the wholly other) that is necessarily ‘otherwise’ than Being. For
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Deleuze (and Spinoza) ethics is ontology because beings are immediately related to
Being at the level of their existence (intensity or degree of power as the element of
immanence). This is why Spinoza entitles his pure ontology an Ethics rather than an
Ontology: his speculative propositions concerning univocity can only be judged
practically at the level of the ethics they envelop or imply.
But these ethical concerns are derived directly from the univocal ontology
developed in Difference and Repetition, and the solution it offers to the problem of
the ontological difference. Being must not only be able to account for the external
difference between beings, but also the fact that beings themselves are multiplicities
marked by an ‘internal difference’; and the ontological difference must not only
refer to the non-categorical difference between Being and beings, but also the
internal difference of Being from itself. The ontological concepts developed in
Difference and Repetition are all non-categorical notions that preserve the univocity
of Being by comprehending this co-articulation of Being and difference within
themselves: ‘difference in intensity, disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the
form of time, the differential in thought: opposition, resemblance, identity, and even
analogy are only effects produced by these presentations of difference’ (DR, p.
145).32 This is the meaning of Deleuze’s formula ‘monism = pluralism’ (univocity
of Being = equivocity of difference).33 It is true that if analogy denies Being the
status of the common genus because (specific) differences ‘are’, then conversely,
univocal Being is indeed common only in so far as (individuating) differences ‘are
not’ and must not be. This is the second fundamental problem of a univocal ontology
that Deleuze confronts and takes to its limit: the (non-)Being of difference is in fact
the reality of the virtual or the problematic. Univocal being, in other words, always
presents itself in a ‘problematic’ form. If one consigns ‘difference’ to the actual or
the empirical, to individuals constituted in experience, one inevitably falls back into
an analogical or equivocal ontology, and subordinates difference to the rights of
identity and negation. A reading of Deleuze’s ontology, yet to be written, would
have to focus on these two fundamental problems.
But why, finally, in the fourth and final act, does univocity disappear from Deleuze’s
writings? The reason, in the end, is not difficult to discern. Other concepts, like that
of the ‘simulacrum’, meet similar fates.34 Deleuze used Klossowski’s concept of the
‘simulacrum’ to think through the problematic of anti-platonism; outside that
context, the concept no longer held any ‘interest’ (since beings no longer ‘simulate’
anything), and was replaced, as it were, by the concept of the agencement or
‘assemblage’. The same is true for univocity. Univocity was an arrow first shot by
Duns Scotus, and which Deleuze then picked up and aimed elsewhere, using it to
interpret Spinoza’s philosophy, critique orthodox theology, and think through
Heidegger’s problem of ontological difference through a confrontation with
Aristotle. Once its (already considerable) work was done, Deleuze’s moved on. In
A Thousand Plateaus, for instance, the logic of est (‘is’) gives way to a conjunctive
logic of et (‘and’), which ‘overthrows ontology’, and places relations ‘outside
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everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole’ (ATP, p. 25; cf. p.
98).35 This is not an appeal to transcendence, but rather a deepening of immanence,
requiring, in later works, the invention of new concepts such as the ‘plane of
immanence’, the ‘outside’, the ‘interstice’, and so on.36 What the drama of univocity
exemplifies is the dynamic nature of Deleuze’s thought, which must be defined and
comprehended in terms of its movement.
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